Around page seventy - well past the sordid stuff the Blago case gets meaty and stars SEIU's Andy Stern who exited the national scene -for a while -only hours before Judge Zagel granted the release of the Federal Case against former Governor Blagojevich.
He will not get cuffed or jailed for cussing his kids.
He will no doubt dodge sitting in the iron hotel altogether.
He will cause the Obama Administration, Dave Axelrod and Valerie ( Cody) Jarrett no end of trips to the Jumbo Sized Jar of CVS antiacid tablets for couple of spin cycles.
Andy Stern existed stage Left, but he'll be back folks! Big Ed, Rachel Maddow and Milkey Matthews as wellas the Chicago Media will parse and nuance the purple Red back to show-stopping and VAT concocting health.
Take a peak at a few pages 79-85.
On approximately November 3, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #117), Harris told Blagojevich that
Harris had been informed that Barack Obama very much cared about Senate Candidate B and
thought Senate Candidate B would make a good senator. Almost immediately after hearing that
Barack Obama thought Senate Candidate B would make a good senator, Blagojevich indicated he
was interested in getting a position as the Secretary of HHS in exchange for naming Senate
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Candidate B as senator. Blagojevich told Harris to research who else had been Secretary of HHS.
Blagojevich also indicated he wanted to leak to the press that he was considering Individual L as a
senate option. Although Blagojevich was not seriously considering Individual L as a senate option,
Blagojevich believed that if those interested in having Senate Candidate B named senator believed
that Blagojevich was, in fact, seriously considering Individual L, then Blagojevich would have
greater leverage to obtain personal benefit in exchange for naming Senate Candidate B as the
senator.
Later on November 3, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #149), Blagojevich talked to Harris again.
During the call, Blagojevich stated his belief that individuals associated with Service Employees
International Union (“SEIU”) were coming to meet with Blagojevich that day to push for Senate
Candidate B’s appointment. During this same conversation, Blagojevich asked when Harris was
going to talk to Individual M. Blagojoevich repeatedly referred to Harris’s conversation with
Individual M as the “off campus discussion.” These conversations were follow-ups to conversations
Blagojevich had with Harris earlier in the summer in which Blagojevich directed Harris to ask
Individual M for Individual M’s campaign fund money in exchange for naming Individual M to the
U.S. Senate Seat. Blagojevich believed that Individual M would provide campaign fund money to
Blagojevich because Individual M could not use the money in a federal election since the rules are
different for Illinois state elections and federal elections.
During this same time period, Blagojevich had several conversations with his wife in which
they discussed job options in addition to Secretary of HHS, such as ambassadorships, that
Blagojevich might be able to get if he named Senate Candidate B to the Senate seat. Blagojevich
expressed significant interest in what these positions paid. Blagojevich specifically tasked Deputy
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Governor A with looking into ambassadorships that Blagojevich might be able to obtain in exchange
for naming Senate Candidate B to the senate seat.
On the afternoon of November 3, 2008, Blagojevich met with Labor Union Official and
another representative of SEIU. During the meeting, there was a discussion about a number of
different candidates for the Senate seat. Both SEIU representatives expressed their view that Senate
Candidate B would be a good choice for the Senate seat. Blagojevich stated that he assumed that
if Obama was interested in Senate Candidate B being named to replace Obama, then Obama would
be in touch with Blagojevich.
On November 4, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #218), Blagojevich talked to Deputy Governor A.
Blagojevich complained that Advisor B, a former staffer who continued to advise Blagojevich, had
informed Blagojevich that Blagojevich should not take the Senate seat himself. Blagojevich
complained to Deputy Governor A that Blagojevich’s “upward trajectory” was stalled because of
Obama’s election. Blagojevich told Deputy Governor A that Blagojevich had made “decisions at
the expense of [his] family’s best interests for . . . [his] job as governor.” Blagojevich informed
Deputy Governor A “now is the time for me to put my fucking children and my wife first, for a
change.”
On November 5, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #255), Blagojevich informed Deputy Governor A
that Labor Union Official, who was one of the officials who had met with Blagojevich on November
3, 2008 to discuss the Senate seat, was coming back to meet with Blagojevich to discuss the Senate
seat. Labor Union Official was set to meet with Blagojevich the following day. Blagojevich talked
through jobs he could request in exchange for naming a candidate to the Senate seat and noted that
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none of them would be attainable if it were not for the fact Blagojevich had the right to fill the
Senate seat.
Later on November 5, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #261), Blagojevich talked to Harris. They
discussed what Blagojevich should say to Labor Union Official regarding what Blagojevich wanted
in exchange for naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate seat. Blagojevich practiced with Harris
his statements to Labor Union Official, including suggesting to Labor Union Official that
Blagojevich was interested in naming Individual L to the Senate seat. Blagojevich and Harris
discussed how Blagojevich could “make a play” for a job in Washington. Harris suggested that
Blagojevich tell Labor Union Official that Blagojevich wanted to accommodate the president-elect,
but also wanted to take care of the people of Illinois. Blagojevich responded by stating “Yeah. And,
and, and my, and me, do I say me.” Harris stated “Right, by, by keeping me strong.” Blagojevich
responded to Harris “But I don’t want that. I’m not looking for that. I’d like to get out, the fuck
outta here.” Shortly thereafter, Blagojevich stated that “the objective is to, to get a good gig over
there.” Harris stated that if Blagojevich’s goal was to trade the Senate seat for a job elsewhere, then
Blagojevich needed to “put it on the table” with Labor Union Official. Thereafter, Blagojevich
continued to practice with Harris his statements for his meeting with Labor Union Official.
Shortly thereafter on November 5, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #262), Blagojevich again talked
to Harris. Harris told Blagojevich that Harris did not think that the president-elect would provide
Blagojevich with a cabinet-level job in exchange for naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate.
Thereafter, Blagojevich and Harris discussed whether Blagojevich could get an ambassadorship in
exchange for naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate seat. Blagojevich told Harris to do research
with trading partners of the United States. Blagojevich questioned whether the president-elect could
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do “something big” in the “private sector” for Blagojevich in exchange for the Senate seat.
Blagojevich and Harris then discussed various private sector jobs Blagojevich might want in
exchange for the Senate seat. Blagojevich directed Harris to start researching private foundations
in which Blagojevich could get a job “right away.” In particular, Blagojevich told Harris to “see
what they pay.” Blagojevich told Harris that either Harris or Deputy Governor A should do the
research, but that word should not get around about the project.
Shortly thereafter on November 5, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #263), Blagojevich had a
conversation with Harris and Deputy Governor A. Based on Harris’s prior conversations with
Blagojevich, Harris informed Blagojevich that Harris had told Deputy Governor A that they were
looking for a “reasonable ask” in exchange for the Senate seat that “takes care” of Blagojevich’s
family and keeps Blagojevich’s future political ambitions open. Harris stated they were now looking
at private foundations in which the president-elect might have influence and would not appear to
look like a “deal” for the Senate seat. Harris suggested they look at private foundations that were
“heavily dependent on federal aid.” Deputy Governor A agreed to help with the research and asked
whether Blagojevich was looking for this job now or after Blagojevich left office in 2010.
Blagojevich stated “now.” Deputy Governor A and Harris discussed with Blagojevich various
private foundations about which they were familiar. Blagojevich stated, “something like that would
be great. What does that pay?” Blagojevich suggested to Harris and Deputy Governor A that it was
difficult to see this kind of deal coming together, but told Deputy Governor A and Harris to find the
foundations that SEIU funded. Deputy Governor A agreed that they should find the foundations
SEIU funded because then SEIU could help broker the deal with Blagojevich. Again, Blagojevich
told Deputy Governor A and Harris to “look into those ones that are funded by labor.”
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Later on November 5, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #281), Blagojevich spoke to Advisor B about
Blagojevich’s interest in getting a private foundation job. Blagojevich told Advisor B that SEIU and
the president-elect could remove the head of a particular foundation and give the position to
Blagojevich. Blagojevich told Advisor B that it was unlikely that he would be able to get a cabinet
position in exchange for the Senate seat, but “Health and Human Service would be my . . . I’d take
that in a second.”
Later on November 5, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #284), Blagojevich again spoke with Deputy
Governor A. Deputy Governor A reported back on research he had done for Blagojevich on private
foundations. In particular, Blagojevich asked Deputy Governor A about a particular charitable
organization that they had discussed previously. Deputy Governor A responded “So, it was founded
by two guys one was an entrepreneur.” Blagojevich responded “No, but how much money does the
guy make?” Deputy Governor A told Blagojevich it was hard to find salaries on-line, but Deputy
Governor A was still looking into the issue of pay. Deputy Governor A also informed Blagojevich
that Blagojevich could sit on other boards to make additional money if Blagojevich took a job with
a private foundation. Deputy Governor A stated that the director of one foundation was “on two
corporate boards and makes around $250,000 a year on the, in addition to her salary.” Blagojevich
responded “Yeah, see that’s what we’d want. That’s it.” Deputy Governor A told Blagojevich that
Blagojevich should make clear during the negotiations for the Senate seat that being on other boards
“would be another part of the game.” Blagojevich responded “That’s right.” Blagojevich told
Deputy Governor A to continue to research foundations. Blagojevich then practiced with Deputy
Governor A what Blagojevich would say publicly about certain criteria he was using to fill the
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Senate seat, including the future senator’s position on health care. In fact, Blagojevich was not
using his publicly-stated criteria to fill the Senate seat.
On the morning of November 6, 2008 (Blagojevich Calls #317, 319, and 321), Blagojevich
talked to Harris. Blagojevich had arranged a meeting with Labor Union Official for later that
afternoon. Harris and Blagojevich discussed the meeting with Labor Union Official and how
Blagojevich could ask for what Blagojevich wanted from Labor Union Official. Blagojevich stated
he had heard that Senate Candidate B might be interested in a cabinet-level position. Blagojevich
suggested he tell Labor Union Official that “they’re willing to give [Senate Candidate B] a cabinet
spot so if that’s the case, then give me the cabinet spot and give her, we’ll give her the Senate.”
Later Blagojevich asked whether they should have someone go to Senate Candidate B and tell
Senate Candidate B that if Blagojevich received the Secretary of HHS position, Blagojevich “could
appoint you in a second.” Later in the call, Harris suggested that Blagojevich request a position as
the paid national coordinator for Change To Win, an organization partially funded by SEIU, in
exchange for naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate seat. Harris suggested to Blagojevich that
the Change to Win idea might be better than a private foundation because the Change to Win job
is controlled by SEIU and Blagojevich would not necessarily have to step down as governor to take
it immediately, like he might have to do with a private foundation job. Blagojevich responded that
the Change to Win idea was a “fucking great idea.” Later, Blagojevich stated he would like to be
on some “corporate boards” in addition to taking the Change to Win job. Harris responded that
Harris thought Change to Win would be a full-time job. Blagojevich asked “would I be able to get
a little extra income though.” Harris responded that he did not think Blagojevich would want to sell
himself to SEIU as a part-time employee. Blagojevich responded “No, but if I could sit on a couple
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a boards, that’s not much time, or teach a class.” Later Blagojevich asked how much the Change
to Win job would pay. Harris suggested it probably paid at least what Labor Union Official made
working for SEIU. Blagojevich responded “I betcha he makes, well he lives on the north shore, you
gotta think he makes more than the governor, right?”
Later on November 6, 2008 (Blagojevich Calls #345 and 347), Blagojevich talked to his
wife. Blagojevich informed his wife that Individual N, a wealthy supporter of Blagojevich’s, had
asked for the vacant Senate seat. Blagojevich stated that he “planted” with Individual N the issue
of Blagojevich needing to figure what he was going to do after being governor in relation to the
Senate seat. Blagojevich informed his wife that Blagojevich was meeting with Labor Union Official
that afternoon. Blagojevich talked to his wife about becoming the national director of Change to
Win and that “hopefully you get paid decent.” Blagojevich also informed his wife that Change to
Win would allow him to form a national network of low wage workers to help in his future political
career. During the conversation, Blagojevich’s wife looked up information about Change to Win
on the internet, in part to determine “what they paid their people in 2006.” Blagojevich’s wife had
trouble finding the salary information on-line. Blagojevich responded “Don’t worry about it. Yeah,
that’s, you negotiate that. I’d like a 4-year contract for a million a year or somethin’. . . . Or 750 or
whatever. It’d have to be good. Obama’s got excess money, he just gives them more money.”
Blagojevich told his wife he was not sure the Change to Win idea would happen, but it was one of
several options.
On November 6, 2008, Blagojevich met with Labor Union Official alone. During the
meeting, Labor Union Official advocated that Senate Candidate B be named to the Senate seat. In
response, Blagojevich lied and informed Labor Union Official that Blagojevich was in “active”
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discussions with Individual L and her father about making Individual L the senator. Thereafter,
Blagojevich made clear to Labor Union Official that he would name Senate Candidate B to the
Senate seat in exchange for being named Secretary of HHS. Labor Union Official told Blagojevich
he did not think being named to Secretary of HHS was going to happen.
On November 7, 2008, Blagojevich discussed his request for the Secretary of HHS position
with several individuals, including Advisor B (Blagojevich Call #375). Although Blagojevich still
thought getting the Secretary of HHS was a longshot, he thought that after the meeting with Labor
Union Official the prospect was “a little likelier.” Blagojevich informed Advisor B, “So [Senate
Candidate B’s] holding Health and Human Services and I’m holding a U.S. Senate seat. Okay?
She’s holding hers with two hands, just kind’a clinging to, you know, little pieces of it. Me, I’ve
got the whole thing wrapped around my arms, mine, okay? . . . I’m willing to trade the thing I got
tightly held to her for something she doesn’t hold quite as tightly. How bad do you want what I have
and can you get the other person [Obama] who’s really got the, this, you know, who’s, who had that,
to do it. If you’re her, you’re [Senate Candidate B], I could be a U.S. Senator and a seat I, I can
hold.”
Later on November 7, 2008 (Blagojevich Calls #403, 405, 406, and 408), Blagojevich spoke
to Harris and Advisor A, a political advisor, about, among other things, Blagojevich’s request for
the Secretary of HHS position and the possibility of obtaining a job with Change to Win. Advisor
A suggested that it would be difficult for Blagojevich to obtain a federal government job that would
require Senate confirmation, but that Blagojevich might be able to get a high-ranking federal job that
did not require Senate approval. Blagojevich rejected Advisor A’s suggestion because the other
high-ranking federal jobs did not pay enough money. Advisor A told Blagojevich that Advisor A
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liked the Change to Win idea. Blagojevich asked whether the Change to Win idea was better than
trying to work out a deal to provide the Senate seat to Individual L. Advisor A indicated the Change
to Win idea was better to help Blagojevich financially and his future politically. Blagojevich agreed.
On November 10, 200823/ (Blagojevich Call #451), Blagojevich discussed the Senate seat
on a conference call with a variety of individuals. During the call, Blagojevich stated “Individual
I thinks we can get [Blagojevich’s wife], uh, on some corporate boards, paid corporate boards. What
do you think of that?” Individual I responded “Could Obama help on the private sector [Individual
F], where it wouldn’t be tied to him? . . . So it wouldn’t necessarily look like one for the other but.”
The majority of the call centered around how Blagojevich could use his ability to fill the Senate seat
to help Blagojevich in his post-political career. Blagojevich noted he was not in a position to state
he would not run for re-election again because he still had “to raise money for lawyers. . . .”
Blagojevich was repeatedly told by individuals on the phone call that he needed to make the Senate
pick and good things would happen later, but that he should not expect to receive a particular thing
right now. In response to one of these statements, Blagojevich’s wife stated “I don’t think you live
your life hoping that somebody is gonna help you down the line.” Blagojevich stated “Yeah,” and
Blagojevich’s wife then stated “That’s a bunch of baloney.”
Ultimately, Blagojevich stopped pursuing the Change to Win idea for several reasons. First,
Blagojevich learned that Labor Union Official’s salary was not what Blagojevich had hoped and
therefore a salary at Change to Win would not be at a level that Blagojevich wanted. Second,
Blagojevich became uncertain that a Change to Win job would still be present in 2010 when
Blagojevich left the governorship because the job was dependent on others being willing to give
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him the position several years later. As a result of these concerns, Blagojevich began to conspire
to trade the Senate seat to Senate Candidate B in exchange for millions of dollars in funding for a
501(c)(4) organization that Blagojevich would start from scratch, could control, and would provide
certainty for a well-paying job after Blagojevich was no longer governor.
On November 11, 2008 (Blagojevich Calls #487, 489), Blagojevich mentioned the idea of
a 501(c)(4) to Harris and that it was a place for Blagojevich “to ultimately be” but it would advocate
for health care while Blagojevich was still governor. Later on November 11, 2008 (Blagojevich Call
#493), Blagojevich told Advisor B that the 501(c)(4) would have “a Board that, you know, I’m
comfortable with and then when I’m no longer governor I go over there.” Blagojevich also
suggested to Advisor B that they should see if Individual N would fund the 501(c)(4) in exchange
for the Senate seat.
On November 12, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #521), Blagojevich informed Harris that CNN was
reporting that Senate Candidate B was going to take a position in the White House. Blagojevich and
Harris discussed the prospect that this was just a rumor meant to make it harder for Blagojevich to
negotiate something of value in exchange for naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate seat.
Blagojevich returned to the prospect of asking for millions of dollars in funding for a 501(c)(4) in
exchange for naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate seat. Blagojevich told Harris that
Blagojevich would name the Board of Directors of the organization so it would be controllable while
Blagojevich was still governor, but that the organization would be without a “major player until I
were to go there.” Later, in reference to associates of Senate Candidate A offering Blagojevich
significant amounts of campaign money in exchange for naming Senate Candidate A to the Senate
seat, Blagojevich stated “what [Senate Candidate A] got third parties saying to me is a heck of a lot
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more substantial than what we’re getting from the Obama people, okay?” Blagojevich stated that
his concern with Senate Candidate A is that Blagojevich does not trust Senate Candidate A to come
through with the promise of campaign money. Shortly thereafter, Blagojevich again instructed
Harris to have the “off campus discussion” with Individual M regarding getting campaign funds in
exchange for naming Individual M to the Senate seat.
Later on November 12, 2008 (Blagojevich Calls #533, 535, and 537), Blagojevich spoke to
Advisor A. Blagojevich explained his 501(c)(4) idea to Advisor A and stated it would be a place
for Blagojevich to get a job after he was governor, like Change to Win. Advisor A told Blagojevich
that Advisor A liked Change to Win better because it had “fewer fingerprints.” Blagojevich stated
his concern with Change to Win was that it might not be there in two years while the 501(c)(4) was
something Blagojevich could “control.”
Shortly thereafter on November 12, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #539), Blagojevich talked to
Harris. Harris told Blagojevich that Harris had talked to United States Congressman A and that
Senate Candidate B was, in fact, going to take a position at the White House.
Immediately after learning that Senate Candidate B may have taken herself out of
consideration for the Senate seat, Blagojevich made a direct effort to obtain money for his 501(c)(4)
in exchange for naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate seat. Blagojevich called Labor Union
Official (Blagojevich Call #541). During the call, Blagojevich informed Labor Union Official that
“one thing” Blagojevich would be interested in was the creation of a “501(c)(4)” issue advocacy
organization. Blagojevich stated the organization would be there if he were not governor anymore.
Blagojevich stated that right now it would be run by people he trusts and it would be a health care
organization. Blagojevich told Labor Union Official that certain wealthy individuals could put $10,
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$15, or $20 million into the organization over night. Blagojevich then stated that he and the
organization could “help our new Senator, [Senate Candidate B], go out” and push an agenda. Labor
Union Official understood that Blagojevich was connecting the funding of the 501(c)(4)
organization to Blagojevich naming Senate Candidate B to the Senate. Although Labor Union
Official told Blagojevich that Labor Union Official would get back to Blagojevich regarding
Blagojevich’s request for money, Labor Union Official never did.
Thereafter, in a series of a calls on November 12, 2008, Blagojevich indicated that his choice
to fill the Senate seat was based on three criteria. In order, Blagojevich indicated his first criterion
was his “legal” situation, which he further indicated was the picking of a candidate whose
appointment might help Blagojevich with his current legal situation in relation to the ongoing federal
criminal investigation into Blagojevich’s actions. At times, Blagojevich indicated that naming
himself the senator would help fit his “legal” criterion because Blagojevich believed he was less
likely to be indicted if he was in Washington D.C. and because, as a Senator, he would have a
“voice” in who the U.S. Attorney was for the Northern District of Illinois, although he would have
to “officially” recuse himself from the decision. Blagojevich’s second criterion was his “personal”
situation, which Blagojevich repeatedly indicated was premised on his and his family’s financial
well being. Blagojevich’s third criterion was his “political” situation.
Later on November 12, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #594), Blagojevich talked to Robert
Blagojevich about filling the Senate seat. Regarding filling the Senate seat, Robert Blagojevich
stated his advice was that Blagojevich “make sure it’s tit for tat, man you get something. I wouldn’t
give anything away.”
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After Blagojevich learned that Senate Candidate B was going to the White House,
Blagojevich still believed that there were several candidates favored by Obama to fill the Senate
vacancy and that Blagojevich might still be able to personally profit from a deal for the Senate seat.
On November 13, 2008, Blagojevich participated in several calls with Advisor B in which
he continued to push his idea of obtaining funding for a 501(c)(4) in exchange for naming a
candidate favored by Obama to the Senate vacancy. In one call on November 13, 2008 (Blagojevich
Call #624), Blagojevich stated that if Senate Candidate B could still get the Senate seat, Blagojevich
thought she would take it. Blagojevich informed Advisor B that Blagojevich had mentioned his
501(c)(4) idea to Labor Union Official. Blagojevich suggested he still might have leverage to get
what he wanted for the Senate seat because Obama would not want Blagojevich to take the Senate
seat himself.
Later on November 13, 2008 (Blagojevich Call #627), Blagojevich again spoke with Advisor
B. Blagojevich asked Advisor B to reach out to Lobbyist A, who Blagojevich knew to have a
friendship with United States Congressman A, to have Lobbyist A pass a message to United States
Congressman A that Blagojevich wanted help with the funding of a 501(c)(4). During the call,
Blagojevich stated, “the mission for Lobbyist A is to, essentially put it in [United States
Congressman A’s] head that we would like them to help us, you know, fund it.” In response,
Advisor B stated that while it was not said, this was “a play to put in play others.” Blagojevich
responded that what Advisor B was saying was “correct.” It was clear to Advisor B that Blagojevich
was saying that Blagojevich wanted to communicate to United States Congressman A that the
funding of the 501(c)(4) would get Obama the person he wanted in the Senate.